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Abstract
Background: Shortages of health workers in low-income countries are exacerbated by the international migration
of health workers to more affluent countries. This problem is compounded by the active recruitment of health
workers by destination countries, particularly Australia, Canada, UK and USA. The World Health Organization (WHO)
adopted a voluntary Code of Practice in May 2010 to mitigate tensions between health workers’ right to migrate
and the shortage of health workers in source countries. The first empirical impact evaluation of this Code was
conducted 11-months after its adoption and demonstrated a lack of impact on health workforce recruitment policy
and practice in the short-term. This second empirical impact evaluation was conducted 4-years post-adoption using
the same methodology to determine whether there have been any changes in the perceived utility, applicability,
and implementation of the Code in the medium-term.
Methods: Forty-four respondents representing government, civil society and the private sector from Australia,
Canada, UK and USA completed an email-based survey evaluating their awareness of the Code, perceived impact,
changes to policy or recruitment practices resulting from the Code, and the effectiveness of non-binding Codes
generally. The same survey instrument from the original study was used to facilitate direct comparability of
responses. Key lessons were identified through thematic analysis.
Results: The main findings between the initial impact evaluation and the current one are unchanged. Both sets of
key informants reported no significant policy or regulatory changes to health worker recruitment in their countries
as a direct result of the Code due to its lack of incentives, institutional mechanisms and interest mobilizers.
Participants emphasized the existence of previous bilateral and regional Codes, the WHO Code’s non-binding
nature, and the primacy of competing domestic healthcare priorities in explaining this perceived lack of impact.
Conclusions: The Code has probably still not produced the tangible improvements in health worker flows it
aspired to achieve. Several actions, including a focus on developing bilateral codes, linking the Code to topical
global priorities, and reframing the Code’s purpose to emphasize health system sustainability, are proposed to
improve the Code’s uptake and impact.
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Background
There is currently a shortage of approximately 7.2 million
healthcare workers worldwide [1]. This global deficit
of physicians, nurses, midwives and other skilled
health professionals undermines the ability of a health-
care system to adequately treat and prevent disease,
and in critical situations, to provide life-saving care for
its constituents.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the regions of the world with
the greatest disease burden concurrently experience the
greatest health workforce shortages [1, 2]. For example,
19 of the 20 countries with the highest maternal mortal-
ity rates are in Africa, and those living with HIV in the
continent account for 72 % of AIDS deaths annually.
Africa has just 4 % of the world’s health workforce while
disproportionately hosting 25 % of the global burden of
disease [3, 4]. Further, sub-Saharan Africa suffers a def-
icit of 2.4 million doctors and nurses, requiring a 130 %
expansion of the current the health workforce to close
this gap. Comparatively, the continent has 13 health
workers per 10 000 population, compared to 68 healthcare
workers per 10 000 in the Americas and 110 per 10 000 in
Europe [5]. The need for specialist physicians is even
more dire, with some countries in sub-Saharan Africa
hosting <1 nephrologist per million population [6].
These shortages are exacerbated by the international
migration of health personnel, who travel from
resource-poor “source” countries to more affluent “des-
tination” countries in search of improved living condi-
tions, increased prospects for and terms of employment,
and better opportunities for their families and children
[2, 7]. This global migration is enabled by international
trade and labour laws, which reaffirm the ability of all
health workers to travel in pursuit of a higher standard
of living, assuming the destination country is able and
willing to accept them [7]. But affluent countries also
have a longstanding history of recruiting healthcare
workers trained abroad to fill under-staffed areas, espe-
cially rural regions and other underserved populations
[7]. The range of stakeholders, recruiters, and health
professions involved in health worker migration make it
difficult to quantify the volume of movement occurring,
or to wholly capture the range of policies and mecha-
nisms in place to regulate this phenomenon. However,
the added “pull” factor of active recruitment, facilitated
by private recruitment agencies, multiple levels of gov-
ernment and NGOs, greatly contributes to the depletion
of health workforces in many low- and middle-income
countries [1, 2, 7]. It is estimated that Australia, Canada,
the United Kingdom (UK) and United States (USA) ac-
count for 72 % of foreign-born nurses and 69 % of
foreign-born physicians [8]. These countries have col-
lectively saved $4.5 billion USD in education costs by
recruiting physicians from countries in sub-Saharan
Africa – countries that lose 30 % of their trained health
workers annually to medical emigration [8]. Exemplify-
ing the volume of economic losses to source countries,
it is estimated that Kenya loses $500 000 USD per emi-
grating physician in investment, and $300 000 USD
per nurse [9].
In Canada alone, 22 % of resident physicians are
trained abroad, the majority of which immigrate from
Africa, and the number of sub-Saharan Africa trained
physicians in Canada has increased by 60 % over the
past ten years [9–11]. In order to mitigate the tensions
between health workers’ rights to migrate and the crit-
ical shortage of health personnel in many source coun-
tries, in 2004 the World Health Assembly (WHA)
requested that the World Health Organization (WHO)
and its member states create a framework to guide the
ethical recruitment and migration of health workers
[12]. The call for the development of a global code ap-
plicable across all countries, health professions and sec-
tors was situated in the context of intensifying calls for
action preceded by multiple bilateral and international
agreements intended to regulate these migratory pat-
terns (Table 1) [12, 13].
The resulting WHO Global Code of Practice on the
International Recruitment of Health Personnel is a vol-
untary, non-binding instrument that was adopted by the
then-193 member states at the 63rd WHA in May 2010
[12]. The Code delineates aspirational goals for health
workforce development in both source and destination
countries: the former are encouraged to achieve work-
force self-sufficiency through improved retention of
health workers, while the latter are encouraged to refrain
from actively recruiting from countries with critical
health personnel shortages [12, 13]. The Code also man-
dates a renewed focus on improving the education, living
and working conditions of health workers in source
countries to mitigate the “push” factors that encourage
emigration (Table 2) [13]. Knowledge- and resource-
sharing to strengthen source countries’ health human re-
source capacity is also emphasized [13].
However, as an instrument without clear incentives,
institutional mechanisms, or interest mobilizers, the
Code may not be able to induce the changes sought, in-
stead making the implementation of its provisions
dependent on countries’ own willingness and capacity to
act upon the norms it proposes [14, 15]. As such, the
success of the Code can be inferred in part from the pol-
icy and regulatory changes voluntarily adopted by mem-
ber states to comply with its provisions. In 2011, Edge &
Hoffman (co-authors of this study) conducted the first
empirical impact evaluation of the Code to determine its
efficacy in affecting national and sub-national change
[13]. Their findings suggested that the impact of the
Code was limited at eleven-months post-adoption, with
Tam et al. Globalization and Health  (2016) 12:62 Page 2 of 12
Table 1 Comparing the various current international Codes on health workforce recruitment
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a majority of their key informant survey respondents in-
dicating that the Code had had little meaningful impact
on policies or regulations governing health personnel re-
cruitment in their countries of work [13]. The authors
postulated that the mere adoption of the Code was in-
sufficient to fill the gap between high-level demands for
action at the international level and the knowledge and
practice of sub-national stakeholders, and called for
greater advocacy and awareness of the Code at the na-
tional and sub-national levels [13]. The need for in-
creased prioritization of the Code’s principles was
emphasized by multiple studies evaluating its impact in
the short-term [13, 16, 17].
Reports of country-specific implementation collected
by WHO yielded similarly disappointing results. To
monitor global progress on the Code’s implementation,
each member state was asked to designate a National
Authority that would be responsible for reporting on the
country’s implementation status every three years using
a universal National Reporting Instrument [12]. This in-
strument is a cross-sectional self-assessment survey
assessing progress on all 10 articles of the Code [12]. In
the first and only reporting period to date (March-June
2012), less than half of all signatories had formally desig-
nated a National Authority (44 %), while only 37 of the
possible 193 member states (19 %) reported having taken
steps to implement the Code. However, even these num-
bers may be an overestimate, as the instrument relies
solely on self-reported answers to close-ended questions.
No supplementary mechanisms exist through which to
ensure questions are appropriately interpreted, or to ver-
ify the validity of responses, rendering the tool limited in
its ability to capture the real situation and nuances of
each country’s experience.
In spite of these various challenges, the Code does
seem to have helped galvanize international attention for
the importance of ethical health personnel recruitment.
It received renewed commitment through the Recife
Declaration adopted at the Third Global Forum on Hu-
man Resources for Health, and has been cited by many
countries as an important impetus for action on
strengthening their health human resource capacity
[16, 18, 19]. However, while it is difficult to isolate the
impact of the Code on health worker migration, there
certainly have been no notable improvements in health
workforce flows from regions of the world where the
shortages are most dire: 2013 data from the American
Medical Association Physician Masterfile (AMAPHM)
demonstrated a 5.4 % annual growth rate in the number
of sub-Saharan African-trained physicians joining the
US physician workforce, while the proportion of
African-trained physicians in Canada has continued to
increase from 1996 to date [20–22]. Despite the appar-
ent increasing recognition of the severity of the global
health worker shortage, little measurable progress has
been made to support implementation of the Code and to
affect global regulatory change. The Code’s insufficient up-
take was highlighted at the 67th World Health Assembly
in May 2014, when WHO was asked to develop a Global
Strategy on Human Resources for Health: while the Code
was cited as a “watershed” moment for global health hu-
man resources, its current utility was said by some com-
mentators to be primarily as “a reporting exercise, rather
than a catalyst for improved health workforce policy” [23].
This study represented a medium-term empirical im-
pact evaluation of the Code, four years after its adoption.
It sought to determine whether there have been signifi-
cant changes in stakeholders’ perception of the imple-
mentation, utility, and relevance of the Code since the
initial evaluation conducted by Edge & Hoffman over
three years prior [13]. It also aimed to determine
whether the Code’s provisions reached their end-user,
namely the policymaker, recruitment official or health
workforce regulator, who would be expected to have
awareness of or have contributed to changes in policy
and practice made in direct response to the Code. Fi-
nally, by evaluating the real-world impacts of the Code,
this study aimed to help build the evidence base on
whether such non-binding agreements are capable of in-
citing the tangible changes they aspire to.
Study design and methods
This follow-up study repeated the same methodology
that was initially developed for the first empirical impact
evaluation of the Code conducted only eleven months
after its adoption by the WHA [13]. Specifically, a survey
sampling frame of 393 civil society, government and pri-
vate sector key informants from the four English-
speaking countries with the highest volume of migrant
health personnel – namely Australia, Canada, UK and
USA – was assembled from the participant list of the
Third Global Forum on Human Resources for Health
and the International Health Workforce Collaborative,
through snowball sampling, and from purposive internet
Table 2 Summary of “push” and “pull” factors on the migration
of health workers
Push factors encouraging emigration from source countries include:
• Poor remuneration
• Concerns for personal safety
• Few career prospects and opportunities for promotion
• Poor working conditions and heavy workload
• Poor living conditions
Pull factors encouraging immigration to destination countries include:
• Better remuneration
• Safer environment
• Professional development and career advancement opportunities
• Improved working conditions and facilities
• Higher standards of living
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searches for authors of relevant publications from each
country. The search for these publications was con-
ducted between May and June 2014. Examples of search
terms used included “human resources for health”,
“international health worker recruitment”, and “health
worker migration”, along with one of the four country
names. Individuals were selected for their role in directly
recruiting, regulating, setting policies about and/or
researching the international recruitment and retention
of health personnel, based on information from profiles
available in the public domain.
The survey instrument from the original study was
used to facilitate the direct comparability of responses
[13]. Survey questions aimed to evaluate informants’
awareness of the Code and knowledge of any regulations
and/or recruitment policies that were changed as a re-
sult of the Code’s adoption. The survey also assessed re-
spondents’ perceived impact of the Code and their
opinions of non-binding instruments more broadly
(Table 3). An initial invitation email was sent to all par-
ticipants in May 2014, followed by three reminders over
June-July 2014. Final responses were received in August
2014 and analyzed thereafter.
Ethics approval
This study was approved by the McMaster University
Research Ethics Board in Hamilton, Ontario, Canada. To
facilitate confidentiality, participants were assigned a
unique identifier based only on country and sector; iden-
tifying details including job titles or affiliated organiza-
tions were dissociated from responses prior to analysis.
Data analysis
A thematic analysis approach was followed to extrapo-
late key themes from the qualitative responses. This in-
volved an initial sorting of the responses into
constructed descriptive categories and the subsequent
definition of analytical themes. Themes were thus deter-
mined by the data itself and not in accordance with any
initial hypotheses that might have influenced results.
Quantitative descriptive statistics were extracted based
on the coded responses, and representative quotations
were identified.
Results
A total of forty-four responses were received with all
four countries and three sectors represented, yielding
an approximate response rate of 11 %. Civil society
respondents were from academic institutions, think-
tanks, research centres, and workforce planning organi-
zations. Government respondents were from workforce
regulation agencies and ministries of health. Private
sector respondents were from health worker recruit-
ment and training agencies. Respondent job titles
included Associate Deputy Minister, Deputy Director,
Senior Team Leader, and Senior Health Economist,
among others.
Awareness of the Code
Eighteen respondents (41 %) indicated that they were
largely unaware of the Code and its impact despite
Table 3 Survey instrument
1. From your perspective, to what extent are your colleagues generally
aware of the WHO Global Code of Practice on the International
Recruitment of Health Personnel in your field of work (consider
knowledge of the Code’s purpose and contents)?
2. Are you aware of any anticipated changes to take place within your
country as a result of the WHO Code of Practice (e.g. influence
decisions relating to health policy, health professional regulation,
health facility administration, recruitment practices)?
3. Do you know of any particular examples where the WHO Code of
Practice influenced specific changes? Please describe any examples
that come to mind.
4. From your perspective, has the WHO Code of Practice resulted in any
changes to the way that health workers are recruited to your
country? If so, how are health workers recruited differently? If not, do
you know why changes did not take place (e.g. too soon to
implement recommendations, processes were already compliant with
the Code, changes were made previously in response to other factors,
recommendations in the Code were not feasible)?
5. From your perspective, in what ways has your own work changed as
a result of the WHO Code of Practice or as a result of policy changes
that were made directly due to the WHO Code of Practice? If no
changes have occurred so far, do you expect any changes in your
personal work will take place in the future?
6. Based on your personal knowledge and experience, please rate your
level of agreement with the following statement by marking a “X”
beside the numerical value associated with your rating [please mark
only one “X”]: “The WHO’s Global Code of Practice on the
International Recruitment of Health Personnel has had a meaningful
impact on health workforce recruitment, practices, policies, or
regulations in my country.”
i. _____Strongly Disagree [1]
ii. _____Moderately Disagree [2]
iii. _____Slightly Disagree [3]
iv. _____Neither Agree nor Disagree [4]
v. _____Slightly Agree [5]
vi. _____Moderately Agree [6]
vii. _____Strongly Agree [7]
7. From your perspective, are there any general or specific changes that
could be made to the WHO Code of Practice to improve its impact
on the health workforce recruitment, practices, policies, or
regulations in your country? Please describe any amendments
that come to mind.
8. Are you aware of the complementary guidelines informing the
implementation of the Code of Practice? If so, are you aware of any
instances when the guidelines have been applied in your work or the
work of your colleagues? Please describe any instances that come
to mind.
9. From your perspective, do you think these kinds of voluntary,
non-binding global codes of practice are effective instruments for
influencing change in your country? Please explain why or why not.
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working in organizations for the licensure of inter-
national medical graduates (n = 2), health workforce
modeling (n = 4), health workforce planning and re-
search (n = 8), health policy and workforce development
(n = 3), and international workforce equity (n = 1).
Ten respondents indicated that their colleagues lacked
an awareness of the Code (23 %). One private sector re-
spondent from Canada stated, “Neither the existence of
such a global Code, nor the WHO role is known within
our health services network” (CAN.PS.1). A civil society
respondent from the USA emphasized, “[My colleagues]
are unaware of the problem and any possible solu-
tions” (US.CS.1). The two respondents reporting some
level of awareness suggested that the Code was likely
more familiar to colleagues in developing countries.
One respondent mentioned, “My impression is that
my Canadian colleagues have minimal awareness of
the Code…while colleagues in developing countries
where we work, such as Jamaica and Zambia, are
much more aware of it” (CAN.CS.2).
Ten respondents reported that their colleagues were
likely to be familiar with the Code (23 %). Of these, col-
leagues who were researchers and senior academics
were reported as likely knowledgeable about the instru-
ment (n = 5). However, colleagues whose work directly
impacted health workforce planning, such as those
working in health authorities and the health policy
community were reported to be generally unaware of
the Code (n = 4).
Among the three individuals reporting that their col-
leagues were “very aware” of the Code (7 %), two indi-
viduals were from Australia, while one Canadian
respondent referred to the Code in conjunction with the
Melbourne Manifesto, which, they surmised, collectively
provided a basis for discussing issues affecting health
worker migration. One of the Australian respondents
stated, “I believe all senior academics would be aware of
the WHO Code, including its global purpose” (AU.G.1).
Changes resulting from the Code
Of the four individuals reporting anticipated policy or
regulatory changes as a result of the Code, a Canadian
government respondent declared, “…we are consistently
working with colleagues to ensure that our policies fol-
low the Code – I would say that this would be true of all
jurisdictions in Canada” (CAN.G.1). However, the vast
majority of respondents indicated that they were not
aware of any anticipated changes resulting from the
Code (n = 21; 48 %). One UK respondent suggested that,
as the UK Code of Practice on International Recruitment
preceded the WHO Code, it was difficult to determine
any specific impacts of the latter. Alternatively, a num-
ber of respondents attributed poor implementation to
the primacy of domestic health workforce needs and
competing priorities. One Canadian civil society re-
spondent claimed, “…I expect there to be a greater em-
phasis on international recruitment of health workers to
Canada as both the general population and key health
cadres such as nurses continue to age” (CAN.CS.2). The
prioritization of national deficits was echoed by Ameri-
can and Australian respondents, one of whom suggested,
“My personal commitment is to produce a workforce in
and for the regions in which I work. However, I’m heart-
ened that this social justice issue is on the national and
international agenda” (AUS.CS.3). A civil society re-
spondent from the USA corroborated, saying “there is
very little incentive for healthcare providers to adhere to
the Code – there is actually more domestic incentive to
not adhere to the Code, for example through increased
funding for ‘diversity’ hires” (US.CS.5).
Key informants suggested that strong personal incen-
tives for health workers to leave their countries of origin
explained the lack of change the Code had hoped to
achieve. These “pull” factors included the right of indi-
viduals to migrate for improved political and socioeco-
nomic stability, as well as to achieve a higher standard of
living (n = 3). One Canadian civil society respondent
stated, “The real incentive to keep people in their coun-
try of origin is addressing the social inequalities in these
countries and providing supportive environments…for
them to build meaningful lives in safe conditions. People
don’t leave unless they really have to” (CAN.CS.3).
Existing national or bilateral agreements were also
seen as preeminent to the Code, with respondents refer-
encing tangible regulatory changes following the imple-
mentation of the Melbourne Manifesto and the UK
Code of Practice, among other international codes (n =
4). The Code was often seen as complementary to these
existing agreements, or providing further leverage for
their support, albeit largely incapable of inciting change
directly. As one civil society respondent from the UK
mentioned, “…the UK already had a Code of Practice,
[but] the WHO Code has proved useful in terms of en-
couraging cross departmental work in monitoring the
UK Code” (UK.CS.1). One American civil society re-
spondent also pointed out the “synergistic” impact of the
WHO Code in legitimizing the work of NGOs in trying
to reduce unethical international health worker recruit-
ment (US.CS.8).
Suggestions to improve the Code’s impact
When asked whether the Code had a meaningful impact
on health worker recruitment, fifteen respondents dis-
agreed (34 %), with six and eight individuals indicating
strong and moderate disagreement, respectively. How-
ever, thirteen respondents suggested that no specific
amendments to the Code would improve its effective-
ness in terms of producing change in health worker
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recruitment policy or regulation. In explanation, two re-
spondents suggested that the Code’s “principles were
good” (CAN.CS.1) and that it was “fairly comprehensive”
(US.CS.5), while others cited current domestic changes
to reduce health worker recruitment that were inde-
pendent of efforts to implement the Code (n = 2). One
American civil society respondent explained, “[The USA
government has] strengthened their investments in
health professional education domestically. This was not
a result of the WHO Code but it has helped alleviate the
problem” (US.CS.8).
Of the eleven respondents suggesting possible changes
to the Code to strengthen its impact, four suggested the
principles of the Code be more widely disseminated,
while nine promoted the idea of international public
reporting of individual nations’ adherence. As one Can-
adian civil society respondent pointed out, “I believe the
Code itself is a fully developed tool, but regular inter-
national public reporting on developed countries with
high levels of their health workforce educated in the sec-
ond or third worlds would track the relevance or effect-
iveness of the Code” (CAN.CS.6). Five respondents
urged clearer requirements for accountability and conse-
quences for non-adherence, with one American civil so-
ciety respondent favoring a tax for destination countries
and corresponding financial compensation for source
countries. However, despite supporting improved ac-
countability mechanisms, one Canadian civil society re-
spondent noted a possible barrier to doing so, citing “…
those who are reporting are not those recruiting so there
is a mismatch between activity and accountability”
(CAN.CS.8). Two civil society respondents suggested
promoting action on the social determinants of health to
improve living conditions, while a UK government re-
spondent urged, “the [Code] needs to be turned into a
monitoring board based on indicators…intentions are
nice but numbers are more tangible” (UK.G.1).
Effectiveness of non-binding Codes
Few respondents were of the opinion that voluntary,
non-binding codes such as the WHO Code were effect-
ive instruments through which to influence national pol-
icy (n = 3). The majority of respondents indicated that
the Code was only “somewhat” effective, with propo-
nents offering the rationale that the Code raised the
international profile of the issue (n = 4) and was an ef-
fective tool to support advocacy efforts or to justify im-
plementation of existing bilateral agreements (n = 5).
One respondent suggested a particular utility of the
Code in enabling the “naming and shaming” of non-
adherent countries, claiming, “wealthy countries such as
Australia have ‘pride’ and would not wish to be exposed
as an exploiter and so have made serious endeavors to
adhere to the guidelines” (AUS.CS.3).
Participants reaffirmed that the Code was useful in
principle, but that its utility was undermined by national
health systems that involved multiple levels of leader-
ship. As stated by one American civil society respondent,
“They can be [useful], if they are created with the active
participation of the leaders in the field. At least in the
USA, that leadership is widely distributed, fluid, and def-
initely not of a single mind” (US.CS.4). These sentiments
were echoed by another American respondent, who ar-
gued, “Given that the USA does not have a national
health system, disseminating this information and get-
ting multiple different systems and entities to follow this,
I feel, will be virtually impossible” (US.CS.3).
Ten participants asserted that voluntary, non-binding
Codes were not effective. Respondents cited a lack of ne-
cessary accountability mechanisms (n = 5), in addition to
prevailing health inequities that remain the primary in-
centive to migrate (n = 3). Internal pressures to fill
under-resourced health sectors, and a sense that the
Code was more highly esteemed by developing countries
were also listed as reasons for its ineffectiveness. One
Canadian participant explained, “In developed countries,
there is little sense that these types of WHO edicts apply
to them, whereas in low-income countries, the WHO
carries a lot of weight. In this case, the voluntary, non-
binding nature of the Code makes it a low priority for
all” (CAN.CS.5).
Discussion
Comparative principal findings between current and
initial study
The main findings between the initial impact evaluation
of the Code and the current one (conducted at eleven
months and four years post-adoption, respectively) are
strikingly similar. In both studies, the majority of key in-
formants reported that no significant policy or regula-
tory changes to health worker recruitment had occurred
in their countries as a direct result of the Code. To ex-
plain this lack of impact four years after adoption, we
turned to global health governance frameworks devel-
oped by Hoffman and Røttingen (2015) and Happaerts
(2012) whose shared principles provide a theoretical
basis in which much of the analysis of our responses can
be grounded [14, 24].
In assessing the effectiveness of global health treaties,
Hoffman and Røttingen (2015) derived three characteris-
tics necessary for such agreements to achieve intended
social impacts (defined as those without principally
economic aims). These included: 1) incentives for par-
ticipating actors in alignment with their self-interest
and priorities 2) institutional mechanisms to promote
compliance or penalize divergence from treaty princi-
ples and 3) interest mobilizers, or strong coalitions and
advocacy groups with sufficient resources to promote
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implementation [14]. Similarly, Happaert (2012) posits
that successful uptake of ‘outside-in’ policies (those
that are internationally defined but rely on national and
sub-national leadership for implementation, such as the
Code) requires both 1) the compliance of national
governments with binding agreements, or ‘international
harmonization’ and 2) the promotion of policy models,
or ‘norm-setting’ by international organizations. [24]
The latter is further explained by Bernstein and Cashore’s
discussion of international normative discourse (2002),
where international organizations like the WHO are able
to shape domestic policy by first defining principles of ap-
propriate behaviour and then driving their international
institutionalization by developing a pervasive discourse
around them (through mechanisms such as global fora
and inter-state conventions [24].
Bilateral or regional Codes in incentivizing compliance
To explain the Code’s lack of perceived uptake, many
participants emphasized a lack of incentives for compli-
ance (due to its voluntary, non-binding nature) as well
as the existence of disincentives for adherence (including
the primacy of fulfilling domestic health worker needs.
In both studies, the Code’s impact was perceived to be
secondary to that of the multiple existing bilateral or
region-specific Codes. The precise nature of these agree-
ments better approximate each party’s self-interest
(thereby providing adequate incentive), and include in-
stitutional mechanisms such as penalties for non-
compliance, thus also facilitating international policy
harmonization. For example, during the 1990s the pro-
portion of foreign-trained physicians working in the UK
had increased steadily as a result of recruitment efforts
directed at low-income countries [25–29]. In 2001, the
UK Department of Health introduced the UK’s Code of
Practice on International Recruitment to mandate that
no National Health Service (NHS) employers would
engage in active recruitment of health workers from
low-income countries in recognition of its detrimental
impacts on the latter’s health workforce capacity [27–29].
Penalties for offending agencies include revocation of
ability to supply health workers to the NHS, which was
particularly significant given that the NHS remains the
UK’s largest employer and most important deliverer of
healthcare [27]. An evaluation of the UK Code by
Buchan et al. (2009) demonstrated a “considerable” re-
duction in the influx of health workers to the UK fol-
lowing implementation of the Code: by 2007, only
45.2 % of all new physicians were international medical
graduates, compared to 74.7 % in 2003, with a concur-
rent decrease in the proportion of international medical
graduates from low income countries as well (although
it was aptly noted that these findings could not be at-
tributed solely, or perhaps even principally to the Code
subsequent to the broad range of factors affecting
health worker migration) [29–31].
Bilateral agreements also facilitate the development
of explicit incentive-institution mechanisms that are
agreeable to both nations and thus enable policy
harmonization. For example, the Philippines had be-
come the lead source country of nurses worldwide,
and had the largest proportion of registered nurses
(RNs) working in foreign countries, comprising one-
third of all migrants leaving the country with Canada
as one of the main destination countries [32–36].
Conversely, in 2008, 50 % of Canadian RNs were ex-
pected to retire within 15 years, contributing signifi-
cantly to the nursing shortage expected: the healthcare
needs of its aging population were expected to demand
361 000 RNs by 2016 in the context of a projected short-
age expected to reach 113 000 by the same year [37].
The development of the Philippines-Canada memoran-
dum (2008) facilitated regulated labour movement be-
tween certain Canadian provinces and the Philippines
on the terms that Canada committed to supporting hu-
man resources development in the source country, in-
cluding specifically by describing Canadian funding
mechanisms for recruitment [38]. These explicit provi-
sions thus enabled both the source and destination
country to achieve better regulation of health workforce
flows amongst them, while being able to negotiate terms
acceptable to their self-interest.
Similarly, China and the UK entered into a memoran-
dum of understanding regarding health workforce flows
in 2006 with unique criteria negotiated to optimize the
UK’s health workforce shortages while preventing fur-
ther health workforce inequalities between urban and
rural China. Since 1998, China has produced an excess
of health workers relative to their capacity for absorption
into the health workforce [39]. Comparatively, the UK
had 57 000 fewer nurses than required to fulfill staffing
requirements of the NHS in 2001, with already a large
proportion of the health workforce coming from low-
income countries overseas [26, 28, 29, 40]. However,
Chinese physician-density in urban areas was and con-
tinues to be twice that in rural areas, whereas nurse-
density is tripled in urban vs. rural centres, resulting in
within-province inequalities in health worker density of
up to 82 % [41]. This rural to urban displacement com-
bined with overall excess health worker production re-
sults in a unique set of challenges that China attempted
to mitigate in part through bilateral agreements regulat-
ing where destination countries including the UK could
recruit workers from, resulting in a UK-China memoran-
dum (2006) that mandated that the UK recruit from
China through regulated agencies only, and prohibiting
any direct recruiting of physicians or nurses and any
recruiting from rural areas [38].
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Consequently, country-/region-specific codes such as
the bilateral agreements and the UK Code have been
comparatively more successful in managing health work-
force flows than the WHO Code itself, and indeed are a
precedent encouraged by the WHO Code. Thus, a focus
on developing such targeted agreements would facilitate
nations’ compliance with the international norm, while
doing so in a way that may more effectively achieve de-
sired outcomes as a result of their binding nature and
clearer incentives for adherence.
Institutional mechanisms for compliance and
accountability
The impact of a lack of incentives on the Code’s effect-
iveness is compounded by a lack of ‘institutional mecha-
nisms’, including penalties to discourage non-compliance
or strict accountability mechanisms to monitor progress.
Many participants proposed a greater role for the WHO
in imposing consequences on deviant countries to better
facilitate compliance: participants touted the benefits of
levying a “solidarity tax” on recipient countries for each
health worker gained, or through “naming and shaming”
non-compliant countries through public fora. While
substantive penalties are absent from the voluntary Code
by definition, the WHO could remedy this deficiency by
instead increasing accountability and reinforcing respon-
sibility of destination countries through a renewed focus
on gathering more specific, measurable indicators. These
could include assessing mechanisms used to increase the
size of the domestic workforce, including increasing
health professional school enrollment, subsidies for
health professional students, and incentives for rural and
remote practice. These additional indicators could be
used to quantify the health human resources gap more
precisely, while also serving as benchmarks of national
progress in achieving health workforce sustainability.
Shaping normative discourse
As a voluntary instrument ratified by the WHO, where
the Code was poised and indeed perceived to have the
most impact is through shaping the normative discourse
around the international health workforce [24]. Indeed,
despite the majority of participants believing the Code
had not produced tangible changes, a large number of
participants reported also their belief that no revisions
could be made to improve its impact. Where the first
study ascribed the resulting lack of impact in part to in-
sufficient elapsed time, publicity, and support for imple-
mentation, little has changed three years later in the way
of the Code’s promotion and subsequent uptake. And
when the WHO was asked to develop a Global Strategy
on Human Resources for Health, the WHO Code was
seen more prominently as a watershed moment than as
a catalyst for change in global health human resources
[18]. Yet participants in this study still described the
Code as a “fully developed tool” with sound principles,
despite few member states adhering to its norms in
practice. Clearly, despite having few implementation or
accountability mechanisms, voluntary instruments such
as the Code can serve an important role in galvanizing
stakeholder attention and subsequently ensuring the
issue is prioritized on both global and national agendas
[24, 42]. The ability of non-binding codes to raise an is-
sue’s global profile was recognized even by the respon-
dents who suggested that voluntary codes were generally
of low- to mixed-effectiveness. These merits of the
WHO Code became evident when it received renewed
commitment from attendees of the Third Global Forum
on Human Resources for Health, which cited the Code
as an important global commitment whose principles
should be adopted by all countries [18].
WHO as interest mobilizer
Instead of focusing on the need for external advocacy ef-
forts, the WHO’s inherent capacity as an international
norm-setting agency can be capitalized on to serve as its
own ‘interest mobilizer’. For example, the Third Global
Forum framed the Code and its focus on human re-
sources for health as an integral part of achieving uni-
versal health coverage (UHC), which has emerged as a
topical global priority [18]. By purposefully linking the
Code with current global health priorities, the Third
Global Forum highlighted an opportunity for renewing
attention to the principles of the Code and encouraging
its implementation without expending additional re-
sources on its advertisement. WHO could further
capitalize on this momentum by linking the Code with
other priorities, such as the Sustainable Development
Goals (SDGs), accomplished by referring to the Code in
further discussions on UHC and the SDGs, or in global
fora or technical consultations concerning the ongoing
development of the WHO’s global strategy on human re-
sources for health, most recently presented at the 69th
World Health Assembly for draft consideration [43].
These efforts could serve the dual purpose of ensuring
that the Code continues to be publicized among mem-
ber states, and that national and sub-national discussions
concerning UHC, the SDGs and Human Resources for
Health would inevitably involve a deliberate focus on the
state of implementation of the Code.
Framing and naming to optimize relevance
Finally, eighteen respondents (41 %) indicated that they
were unable to provide answers to all questions in the
survey, with many suggesting either that their work did
not directly overlap with the Code, or that they had lim-
ited knowledge of the instrument and its impact. As
mentioned, this is despite their working in organizations
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for the licensure of international medical graduates,
health workforce modeling, health workforce planning,
health workforce development, and international work-
force equity. Many respondents also discussed the idea
that the Code was limited in its scope, and that it
neglected to address broader drivers of health worker
emigration such as poor working conditions or uncertain
employment prospects in home countries. However, the
Code actually devotes multiple articles to outlining prin-
ciples of sustainable health workforce development
(Table 4). These and other provisions of the Code render
it wider in scope and thus more broadly applicable than
respondents initially perceived. This is perhaps due in
part to the Code’s title, which is narrowly focused on
international ethical recruitment. To more accurately
capture the Code’s holistic principles, a reframing of its
intent and purpose would be prudent. In practice, this
can be accomplished by talking about the Code as
framework for health workforce sustainability – which,
in fact, more accurately depicts its purpose and might
better attract the attention of stakeholders it was
intended to influence. In the future, the naming of global
governance instruments should be critically scrutinized
to avoid any possible narrowing or misinterpretations of
purpose, and to ensure the full range of relevant stake-
holders are engaged from the beginning (Table 5).
Strengths and limitations of the study
The main limitations of this study include its rela-
tively small sample size and the distribution of re-
spondents across countries and sectors. This limits
the generalizability of the results and introduces an
unquantifiable amount of participation bias in the
sample. Respondent composition also favored Canadians
and civil society, while the private sector and UK were
least represented. However, the survey was not intended
to be nationally representative, and these limitations are
offset by the variety of eminent positions held by the re-
spondents, as well as the high degree of inter-respondent
agreement that transcended both sectors and sampled
countries. Consequently, the reported results may be indi-
cative of the perspectives of seasoned experts and leaders
with broad experience in national and global health hu-
man resources.
Additionally, participants were likely self-selective in
favour of those who were aware of the Code, implying
that many respondents who declined participation were
likely unaware of the framework. Thus, the proportion
of national and sub-national actors aware of the Code in
the four countries could be over-represented in our sam-
ple, such that the perceived impact of the Code may be
even more unsatisfactory than presented here.
This study has four notable strengths. The first is the
timeframe in which it was completed: the WHO had re-
leased complementary implementation guidelines for the
Code four years prior, and the first national reporting
deadline on implementation of the Code had passed
(March-June 2012) with significant time elapsed for ana-
lysis and reporting. This study was able to build on the
analyses provided by the report on country’s implemen-
tation as well as other recent analyses of the Code’s ef-
fectiveness, and is the first evaluation of the Code to
compare empirical impact with that reported by coun-
tries. There was also a high degree of concordance be-
tween the responses received across sectors and
countries, which suggest possibly that an increased num-
ber of respondents would likely have yielded similar
qualitative results. Many respondents also qualified their
responses with rich detail, enabling informed, compara-
tive analyses. Finally, the senior positions held by the
majority of respondents qualified them to speak
knowledgeably about the perceived impact (or lack
thereof ) of the Code on their practice.
Conclusions
The Code was intended to serve as the first globally ap-
plicable framework to mitigate the impact of health
workforce migration on countries experiencing severe
health worker shortages. It was adopted amidst growing
Table 4 Articles of the Code supporting sustainable health
workforce development
Sub-articles of the Code encourage member states to:
• Consider adopting measures to address the geographical
maldistribution of health workers and to support their retention in
underserved areas, such as through the application of education
measures, financial incentives, regulatory measures, social and
professional support (Article 5.7)
• Consider strengthening educational institutions to scale up the
training of health personnel and developing innovative curricula to
address current health needs (Article 5.5)
• Include [in bilateral/regional agreements] the provision of technical
assistance, support for health personnel retention, support for training
in source countries, twinning of health facilities, support for capacity
building in the development of appropriate regulatory frameworks
(Article 5.2) [7]
Table 5 Summary of key policy recommendations
1. Subnational and national stakeholders:
a. Develop bilateral and national Codes of Practice adherent to the
norms set by the Code
2. Global stakeholders:
a. Collect data on measurable indicators destination countries are
using to increase the size of their domestic workforce
b. Further link the Code and its principles to the achievement of
topical global health priorities through press releases, impending
forums or technical briefings
3. All stakeholders: Reframe the Code when referenced in national and
sub-national fora to reflect its consideration of broader factors
contributing to health worker migration
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international disquiet concerning the high volume of mi-
gratory flows from low- to high-income countries, and
the global community was lauded for taking a step for-
ward to mitigate this disparity. However, multiple assess-
ments of its effectiveness have now demonstrated
insufficient national uptake and implementation of the
Code’s principles. Little has changed since the initial im-
pact evaluation of the Code three years ago; since then,
the Code has still not produced the tangible improve-
ments in health worker flows it aspired to achieve and
WHO has yet to modify its approach on the issue. The
deficit of action should raise questions about the poten-
tial impact of developing similar global instruments on
different health issues in the future. Such codes of prac-
tice, in line with the WHO’s capabilities, are intended to
set norms, propose policies and encourage institutional
arrangements that comply with globally defined stan-
dards. Yet this study and the preceding impact evalu-
ation emphasize the bilateral and regional Codes and the
importance of sustained promotion and advocacy efforts
to support the uptake of voluntary codes’ norms. As the
latter has so far been insufficient to support widespread
uptake of the WHO Code, further study would be useful
to analyze the aggregate impact and relative utility of bi-
lateral and regional Codes in comparison to global in-
struments looking to achieve similar goals. Perhaps this
analysis might yield valuable insight into circumstances
of adoption, monitoring, incentives and dissemination
methods that can be adapted to optimize the effective-
ness of voluntary global codes in the future.
Nonetheless, there may be numerous interventions
that could strengthen the Code’s impact. This study
highlights several such opportunities that could be pur-
sued by WHO and other global health organizations,
such as further linking the Code to top global priorities,
collecting data on indicators used by source and destin-
ation countries to increase the size of their domestic
health workforce, and reframing the Code’s purpose to
emphasize health system sustainability to engage a
broader set of stakeholders. This set of actions could ad-
dress the challenges reported by the sub-national stake-
holders that comprised the majority of respondents in
this study. In the meantime, the Code has drawn global
attention to the health workforce crisis, if only at one
moment in time. If such codes continue to be developed,
the challenge moving forward will be learning how to
capitalize on their norm-setting capacity to translate ini-
tial motivation and commitment into sustained action.
Abbreviations
AIDS: Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome; AMAPHM: American Medical
Association Physician Masterfile; HIV: Human Immunodeficiency Virus;
NGO: Non-governmental organization; NHS: National Health Service;
RN: Registered nurse; SDG: Sustainable Development Goal; UK: United
Kingdom; USA: United States of America; USD: US dollar; WHA: World Health
Assembly; WHO: World Health Organization
Acknowledgements
Thank you to Pascal Zurn, Carmen Dolea and Jean-Marc Braichet for providing
feedback on the original study design.
Funding
This work was completed as part of the International Collaboration for
Capitalizing on Cost-Effective and Life-Saving Commodities (i4C) that is
funded through the Research Council of Norway’s Global Health & Vaccin-
ation Programme (GLOBVAC Project #234608).
SJH is financially supported by the Canadian Institutes of Health Research,
the Research Council of Norway, and the Trudeau Foundation.
Availability of data and materials
Not applicable.
Authors’ contributions
VT led the implementation of the study, including compiling the list of
respondents, analyzing the survey responses, and writing the first draft of the
manuscript. JSE and SJH led the design of the study and provided successive
rounds of detailed feedback on drafts of the manuscript. All authors read
and approved the final manuscript.
Competing interests
SJH was employed by the World Health Organization’s Department of
Human Resources for Health when the WHO Global Code of Practice on the
International Recruitment of Health Personnel was being developed. JSE was
an intern with the World Health Organization’s Department of Human
Resources for Health in their Health Workforce Migration and Retention
programme when guidelines for monitoring the implementation of the
WHO Global Code of Practice on the International Recruitment of Health
Personnel were under review. The opinions expressed in this paper are those
of the authors writing in their academic capacities and do not necessarily
represent the views of their past or current institutions.
Consent for publication
An explicit statement of intent to share the results of this study through
publication in academic journals was included in the letter of information.
Ethics approval and consent to participate
This study was approved by the McMaster University Research Ethics Board
in Hamilton, Ontario, Canada. Participants received a detailed letter of
information/consent preceding receipt of the study survey outlining the
terms of participation and ability to withdraw. To facilitate confidentiality,
participants were assigned a unique identifier based only on country and
sector; identifying details including job titles or affiliated organizations were
dissociated from responses prior to analysis.
Author details
1Michael G. DeGroote School of Medicine, McMaster University, Hamilton,
ON, Canada. 2Cumming School of Medicine, University of Calgary, Calgary,
AB, Canada. 3Global Strategy Lab, Centre for Health Law, Policy & Ethics,
Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa, 57 Louis Pasteur St, Ottawa, ON K1N
6N5, Canada. 4Department of Clinical Epidemiology & Biostatistics and
McMaster Health Forum, McMaster University, Hamilton, ON, Canada.
5Department of Global Health & Population, Harvard T.H. Chan School of
Public Health, Harvard University, Boston, MA, USA.
Received: 6 November 2015 Accepted: 21 September 2016
References
1. World Health Organization. A universal truth: no health without a workforce.
Geneva; 2014. Available from: http://www.who.int/workforcealliance/
knowledge/resources/GHWA-a_universal_truth_report.pdf?ua=1.
2. Aluttis C, Bishaw T, Frank MW. The workforce for health in a globalized
context – global shortages and international migration. Glob Health Action.
2014;7. doi:10.3402/gha.v7.23611.
3. Naicker S, Plange-Rhule J, Tutt RC, Eastwood JB. Shortage of healthcare
workers in developing countries–Africa. Ethn Dis. 2009;19(1):60.
4. Bangdiwala SI, Osegbeaghe Okoye MBBSMP. Workforce resources for health
in developing countries. Public Health Rev. 2010;32(1):296.
Tam et al. Globalization and Health  (2016) 12:62 Page 11 of 12
5. Naicker S, Eastwood JB, Plange-Rhule J, Tutt RC. Shortage of healthcare
workers in sub-Saharan Africa: a nephrological perspective. Clin Nephrol.
2010;74:S129–33.
6. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. International
migration of health workers. 2010. Available from: http://www.who.int/hrh/
resources/oecd-who_policy_brief_en.pdf.
7. Cometto G, Tulenko K, Muula AS, Krech R. Health workforce brain drain:
from denouncing the challenge to solving the problem. PLoS Med.
2013;10(9):e1001514.
8. Aluttis C, Bishaw T, Frank MW. The workforce for health in a globalized
context: global shortages and international migration. Glob Health Action.
2014;7:23611.
9. Labonte R, Packer C, Klassen N, Kazanjian A, Apland L, Adalikwu J, et al. The
brain drain of health professionals from sub-Saharan Africa to Canada. Cape
Town: African Migration & Development Series No. 2; 2006. Available from:
http://www.queensu.ca/samp/sampresources/samppublications/mad/MAD_
2.pdf.
10. Labonte RN, Packer C, Klassen N. Managing health professional migration
from sub-Saharan Africa to Canada: a stakeholder inquiry into policy
options. Hum Resour Health. 2006;4:22.
11. Siyam A, Zurn P, Rø OC, Gedik G, Ronquillo K, Co CJ, et al. Monitoring the
implementation of the WHO Global Code of Practice on the International
Recruitment of Health Personnel. Bull World Health Org. 2013;91:816–23.
12 World Health Organization. The WHO global code of practice on the
international recruitment of health personnel. Geneva: Sixty-third World
Health Assembly; 2010. Available from: http://www.who.int/hrh/migration/
code/code_en.pdf.
13 Edge JS, Hoffman SJ. Empirical impact evaluation of the WHO Global Code
of Practice on the International Recruitment of Health Personnel in
Australia, Canada, UK and USA. Glob Health. 2013;9:60.
14 Hoffman SJ, Røttingen JA. Assessing the expected impact of global health
treaties: evidence from 90 quantitative evaluations. Am J Public Health.
2015;105(1):26–40. doi:10.2105/AJPH.2014.302085.
15 Hoffman SJ, Røttingen JA, Frenk J. Assessing proposals for new global
health treaties: an analytic framework. Am J Public Health. 2015;105(8):1523–
30. doi:10.2105/AJPH.2015.302726.
16 Regional Network for Equity in Health in East and Southern Africa. Taking
the WHO Global code of Practice on the International Recruitment of health
Personnel from bottom drawer to negotiating table and action in Africa.
Equinet Policy Series No. 38; 2014. Available from: http://www.equinetafrica.
org/bibl/docs/EQ%20Polbrief%2038%20Code%202014.pdf.
17 Brugha R, Crowe S. Relevance and Effectiveness of the WHO Global Code
Practice on the International Recruitment of Health Personnel – Ethical and
Systems Perspectives. Int J Health Policy Manag. 2015;4(6):333–6.
18 Global Health Workforce Alliance. The Recife Political Declaration on Human
Resources for Health: Renewed commitments towards universal health
coverage. 2013. Available from: http://www.who.int/workforcealliance/
forum/2013/recife_declaration_13nov.pdf.
19 World Health Organization. Migration of health workers: The WHO Global
Code of Practice and the global economic crisis. Geneva; 2014. Available
from: http://www.who.int/hrh/migration/14075_MigrationofHealth_Workers.
pdf?ua=1.
20 Tankwanchi ABS, Vermund SH, Perkins DD. Has the WHO Global Code of
Practice on the International Recruitment of Health Personnel been
effective? Lancet Glob Health. 2014;2(7):390–1.
21 Lafortune G. Health workforce planning and mobility in OECD countries.
Bratislava; 2014. Available from: http://www.oecd.org/els/health-systems/
Health-workforce_HRH-planning-mobility.pdf.
22 Canadian Medical Association. Active physicians by country of MD
graduation, Canada, 2015. Accessed 30 June 2015.
23 World Health Organization. Health workforce 2030: towards a global
strategy on human resources for health. Geneva; 2016. Available from:
http://www.who.int/hrh/resources/glob-strat-hrh_workforce2030.pdf.
24 Happaerts. Are you talking to us? How subnational governments respond
to global sustainable development governance. Environ Policy Gov.
2012;22(2):127–42.
25 Dambisya YM, Kadama P, Matinhure S, Malema N, Dulo C. Literature review
on codes of practice on international recruitment of health professionals in
global health diplomacy. South Africa; 2013. Available from: http://www.
equinetafrica.org/bibl/docs/
Diss%2097%20GHD%20Lit%20review%20Codes%20May%202013.pdf.
Accessed 17 May 2015.
26 Buchan J, Jobanputra R, Gough P. London calling? The international




2004.pdf. Accessed 17 May 2015.
27 Buchan J. International recruitment of nurses: policy and practice in the
United Kingdom. Health Serv Res. 2007;42(3 Pt 2):1321–35. doi:10.1111/j.
1475-6773.2007.00710.x.
28 NHS Employers. Code of Practice for international recruitment. United
Kingdom; 2014. Available from: http://www.nhsemployers.org/your-
workforce/recruit/employer-led-recruitment/international-recruitment/uk-
code-of-practice-for-international-recruitment. Accessed 5 July 2015.
29 UK Department of Health. Code of Practice for the international recruitment
of healthcare professionals. United Kingdom; 2004. Available from: http://
www.nursingleadership.org.uk/publications/codeofpractice.pdf.
Accessed 5 July 2015.
30 Buchan J, McPake B, Mensah K, Rae G. Does a code make a difference–
assessing the English code of practice on international recruitment. Hum
Resour Health. 2009;7(1):1.
31 Buchan J, Delanyo D. International recruitment of health workers to the UK:
A report for DFID. Final Report. United Kingdom: DFID Health Systems
Resource Centre; 2004.
32 Blythe J, Baumann A. Internationally educated nurses: profiling workforce
diversity. Int Nurs Rev. 2009;56(2):191–7.
33 Aiken LH, Buchan J, Sochalski J, Nichols B, Powell M. Trends in international
nurse migration. Health Aff. 2004;23(3):69–77.
34 Bach S. International migration of health workers: Labour and Social Issues.
Geneva: International Labour Office; 2003.
35 Burgess R, Haksar V. Migration and foreign remittances in the Philippines. IMF
Working Paper WP/05/111. Washington: International Monetary Fund; 2005.
36 Boschma G, Santiago ML, Choy CC, Ronquillo C. Health worker migration in
Canada: histories, geographies, and ethics. British Columbia; 2012. Available
from: http://mbc.metropolis.net/assets/uploads/files/wp/2012/WP12-02.pdf.
37 Back C, Wei Li O, Guzman J. Current and Emerging Trends. Occupational
Health and Safety in the BC Healthcare Sector. Sector BH. 2008.
38 Dhillon I, Clark M, Kapp R. Innovations in cooperation: a guidebook on
bilateral agreements to address health worker migration. Queenstown:
Aspen Institution; 2010.
39 Anand S, Fan VY, Zhang J, Zhang L, Ke Y, Chen LC. Human resources for
health in China: quantity, quality, and distribution. Lancet [Internet].
2008;372(9651):1774–81.
40 Stewart J, Clark D, Clark PF. Migration and recruitment of healthcare professionals:
causes, consequences and policy responses. Policy Brief. 2007;7(1):1.
41 Youlong G, Wilkes A, Bloom G. Health human resource development in
rural China. Health Policy Plan. 1997;12(4):320–8.
42 Global Health Workforce Alliance. Global strategy on human resources for
health- synthesis paper development. Geneva; 2014. Available from: http://
www.who.int/workforcealliance/media/news/2014/consultation_globstrat_
hrh/en/. Accessed 15 June 2015.
43 World Health Organization. Health workforce and services: Draft global
strategy on human resources for health: workforce 2030. Secretariat report.
2016 Apr 29; A69/38.
•  We accept pre-submission inquiries 
•  Our selector tool helps you to find the most relevant journal
•  We provide round the clock customer support 
•  Convenient online submission
•  Thorough peer review
•  Inclusion in PubMed and all major indexing services 
•  Maximum visibility for your research
Submit your manuscript at
www.biomedcentral.com/submit
Submit your next manuscript to BioMed Central 
and we will help you at every step:
Tam et al. Globalization and Health  (2016) 12:62 Page 12 of 12
